Working Paper No. 09, Martin Heidegger: A Compromised Man by Miller, Mark
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Working Papers in Economics Economics 
3-15-2013 
Working Paper No. 09, Martin Heidegger: A 
Compromised Man 
Mark Miller 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_workingpapers 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, and the Economic Theory Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Citation Details 
Miller, Mark. "Martin Heidegger: A Compromised Man, Working Paper No. 9", Portland State University 
Economics Working Papers. 9. (15 March 2013) i + 15 pages. 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Working 
Papers in Economics by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this 




A	  Compromised	  Man	  
Working	  Paper	  No.	  9	  
	  
Authored	  by:	  	  	  	  Mark	  Miller	  
	  
A	  Contribution	  to	  the	  Working	  Papers	  of	  the	  
Department	  of	  Economic,	  Portland	  State	  University	  
	  
Submitted	  for	  EC447,	  “Economics	  of	  Transition”,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  March	  2013;	  	  	  i	  +	  15	  pages	  
	  
Prepared	  for	  Professor	  John	  Hall	  
	  
Abstract:	  This	  inquiry	  seeks	  to	  establish	  that	  Martin	  Heidegger	  
registered	  as	  a	  compromised	  man	  in	  his	  ethics	  and	  philosophy.	  First,	  
through	  analyzing	  Heidegger’s	  roots	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Pre-­‐Socratics,	  
this	  inquiry	  will	  introduce	  Heidegger’s	  philosophical	  compatibility	  with	  
the	  Nazi	  Party.	  After	  deciphering	  his	  rectorial	  address	  in	  1933	  and	  
subsequent	  actions	  during	  his	  rectorship	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Freiburg,	  
this	  inquiry	  considers	  the	  level	  of	  Nazi	  indoctrination	  in	  Heidegger’s	  
work.	  Finally,	  this	  inquiry	  carefully	  considers	  Heidegger’s	  compromised	  
character	  through	  his	  actions	  in	  the	  post-­‐rectorate	  phase.	  (words:	  83)	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This	  inquiry	  seeks	  to	  establish	  that	  Martin	  Heidegger	  registered	  as	  a	  
compromised	  man	  in	  his	  ethics	  and	  philosophy.	  First,	  through	  analyzing	  
Heidegger’s	  roots	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Pre-­‐Socratics,	  this	  inquiry	  will	  introduce	  
Heidegger’s	  philosophical	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Nazi	  Party.	  Through	  an	  
interpretation	  of	  his	  rectorial	  address	  in	  1933	  and	  subsequent	  actions	  during	  
his	  rectorship	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Freiburg,	  this	  inquiry	  then	  considers	  the	  
level	  of	  Nazi	  indoctrination	  in	  Heidegger’s	  work.	  Finally,	  this	  inquiry	  takes	  
into	  careful	  consideration	  Heidegger’s	  compromised	  character	  through	  his	  
actions	  in	  the	  post-­‐rectorate	  phase.	  	  
	  
Philosophical	  Compatibility	  
“The	  best	  way	  to	  study	  to	  study	  politics	  and	  other	  matters	  is	  to	  trace	  things	  back	  
to	  their	  beginnings	  and	  observe	  their	  growth.”	  	  	  Aristotle	  
According	  to	  Michael	  Allen	  Gillespie	  of	  Duke	  University,	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  
attraction	  to	  Nazism	  was	  rooted	  in	  his	  belief	  that	  it	  presented	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  
crisis	  of	  the	  West,.	  Gillespie	  (2000,	  p.	  141)	  advances	  the	  idea	  that	  Heidegger	  
believed	  Western	  civilization	  to	  be	  in	  crisis	  resulting	  from	  a	  withdrawal	  and	  
forgetfulness	  of	  the	  question	  of	  Being.	  For	  Heidegger,	  existence	  itself	  is	  
mysterious	  and	  Being	  is	  to	  be	  seen	  only	  as	  a	  question.	  Western	  civilization	  is	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rooted	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Socratic	  perception	  of	  the	  question	  of	  Being,	  later	  being	  
replaced	  by	  the	  Platonic	  interpretation	  of	  Being	  as	  an	  eternal	  presence	  only	  
accessible	  through	  an	  arduous	  dialectical	  ascension.	  This	  was	  later	  replaced	  
by	  the	  Christian	  view	  that	  Being	  is	  only	  attainable	  through	  grace,	  pushing	  
Being	  into	  territories	  beyond	  reach	  and	  effectively	  giving	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  
a	  role	  to	  play.	  Gillespie	  (2000,	  p.	  141-­‐2)	  asserts	  that	  for	  Heidegger,	  modernity	  
is	  characterized	  by	  the	  death	  of	  God,	  causing	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  Being,	  leaving	  
man	  as	  the	  groundwork	  on	  which	  to	  build	  the	  world;	  this	  implies	  that,	  in	  the	  
modern	  world,	  man	  is	  solely	  responsible	  for	  transforming	  nature	  into	  a	  
universal	  object	  that	  can	  be	  manipulated	  (technology,	  for	  Heidegger).	  For	  
Heidegger,	  the	  technological	  motive,	  especially	  for	  Americans	  and	  Marxists,	  is	  
to	  transform	  everything	  into	  a	  raw	  material	  in	  order	  that	  it	  can	  be	  exploited	  
and	  consumed	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  
Gillespie	  (2000,	  p.	  142).	  Heidegger	  thought	  Americans	  and	  Marxists	  falsely	  
believed	  that	  technology	  was	  merely	  a	  tool,	  and	  that	  this	  shortcoming	  would	  
not	  allow	  man	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  it	  prompting	  Heidegger’s	  assertion	  that,	  
to	  save	  the	  West,	  the	  question	  of	  Being	  must	  be	  raised	  as	  the	  question	  of	  
technology.	  	  
	   So,	  for	  Heidegger,	  what	  would	  make	  the	  humanization	  of	  technology	  
possible?	  How	  is	  it	  to	  be	  saved	  from	  Americanism	  and	  Communism?	  Gillespie	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(2000,	  p.	  143)	  purports	  that,	  through	  the	  Nazi’s	  assertion	  of	  leadership	  over	  
theory,	  Heidegger	  saw	  something	  similar	  to	  what	  Aristotle	  called	  phronêsis	  
(practical	  wisdom)	  in	  the	  Nazi’s	  idea	  of	  knowledge	  and	  action.	  Seeing	  what	  he	  
believed	  to	  be	  an	  opportunity	  that	  might	  arouse	  a	  cooperative	  encounter	  with	  
the	  question	  of	  Being,	  Gillespie	  (2000,	  p.	  153)	  interprets	  that	  Heidegger	  
thought	  the	  American	  and	  Communist	  approach	  of	  increasing	  productivity	  fell	  
short,	  and	  that	  only	  the	  Nazi	  movement	  confronted	  the	  Western	  problem	  of	  
technology	  with	  an	  approach	  focused	  on	  humanization	  and	  offered	  a	  chance	  
to	  subordinate	  the	  technological	  problem	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  phronêsis.	  Heidegger	  
(Gillespie,	  2000,	  p.	  153)	  asserts	  that	  technology	  must	  serve	  the	  ends	  of	  human	  
beings,	  thus	  seeing	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  hegemony	  of	  technology	  over	  human	  
action.	  The	  anti-­‐American	  and	  anti-­‐Communist	  sentiments	  of	  the	  Nazis	  
resided	  well	  with	  Heidegger	  (Gillespie,	  2000,	  p.	  154),	  and	  he	  agreed	  with	  their	  
concentration	  on	  entrustment	  in	  the	  sensibilities	  and	  feelings	  of	  the	  German	  
Volk;	  further	  agreeing	  with	  the	  Nazi’s	  persistence	  to	  form	  a	  German	  state	  from	  
the	  German	  Volk.	  An	  important	  qualification	  of	  authenticity	  for	  Heidegger	  
(Gillespie,	  2000,	  p.	  155)	  is	  a	  courageous	  confrontation	  with	  the	  question	  of	  
Being,	  and	  he	  not	  only	  believed	  the	  Nazis	  embodied	  this	  courage,	  he	  believed	  
that	  Hitler	  himself	  was	  dedicated	  to	  confronting	  the	  most	  complex	  and	  
difficult	  of	  questions;	  Heidegger	  had	  even	  hoped	  that	  Hitler	  would	  serve	  as	  an	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inspiration	  to	  the	  German	  Volk,	  provoking	  a	  communal	  consideration	  on	  the	  
question	  of	  Being.	  
	   Gillespie	  (2000,	  p.	  155)	  teaches	  us	  that	  Heidegger	  was	  also	  attracted	  to	  
was	  the	  common	  belief	  between	  the	  Nazis	  and	  pre-­‐Socratics	  that	  knowledge	  
at	  its	  core	  is	  rooted	  in	  praxis.	  	  The	  modern	  place	  of	  technology	  could	  thus	  be	  
humanized	  if	  praxis	  is	  once	  again	  established	  as	  the	  fundamental	  moment	  of	  
human	  life	  and	  of	  phronêsis	  as	  the	  primary	  mode	  of	  human	  knowledge.	  This	  is	  
also	  why	  Heidegger	  (Gillespie,	  2000,	  p.	  156)	  is	  fond	  of	  the	  way	  the	  Nazis	  
transformed	  the	  role	  of	  labor	  (work	  camps),	  technology	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  
is	  simply	  production	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  but	  technology	  under	  the	  
rule	  of	  phronêsis	  emphasizes	  the	  human	  role	  in	  production;	  labor	  is	  service	  to	  
the	  Volk.	  Phronêsis	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  which	  the	  Volk	  is	  successfully	  established,	  
self-­‐governed,	  free,	  and	  leads	  to	  the	  elimination	  of	  class	  differences,	  however,	  
Heidegger	  (Gillespie,	  2000,	  p.	  158)	  purports	  those	  with	  the	  courage	  to	  face	  
death	  and	  question	  Being	  have	  phronêsis,	  a	  leader	  with	  phronêsis	  is	  necessary,	  
and	  the	  Führer	  has	  phronêsis.	  This	  is	  why	  Heidegger	  (Gillespie,	  2000,	  p.	  158)	  
believed	  that	  the	  present	  and	  future	  of	  the	  German	  Volk	  relies	  on	  a	  convincing,	  





The	  closing	  paragraphs	  of	  Heidegger’s	  (Hurst,	  2002,	  p.	  31)	  inaugural	  (and	  
only)	  rectorial	  address	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Freiburg,	  titled	  The	  Self-­‐Assertion	  of	  
the	  German	  University,	  wholly	  encapsulates	  the	  Heideggarian	  view	  of	  National	  
Socialism.	  After	  calling	  out	  the	  Nazi’s	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  politicize	  the	  sciences,	  
Heidegger	  (Hurst,	  2002,	  p.	  31)	  makes	  clear	  that	  his	  attempt	  at	  saving	  the	  
sciences	  is	  only	  meant	  for	  the	  German	  nation;	  Heidegger	  sees	  the	  descent	  of	  
Western	  civilization	  into	  madness	  as	  inevitable,	  and	  he	  holds	  that	  this	  is	  the	  
opportunity	  for	  the	  German	  Volk	  to	  stand	  firm,	  to	  rise	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  the	  
collapse	  of	  the	  West.	  The	  goal,	  for	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  39)	  was	  to	  
unify	  science	  with	  the	  German	  fate,	  a	  fate	  that	  rests	  on	  the	  German	  Volk’s	  
historical	  mission	  (a	  return	  to	  the	  pre-­‐Socratic	  origins);	  the	  German	  Volk	  only	  
knows	  itself	  in	  its	  state.	  This	  nationalism	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  many	  incidents	  
relating	  to	  Heidegger	  during	  his	  brief	  stint	  as	  rector.	  
	   A	  short	  month	  after	  his	  inauguration,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  39),	  
on	  May	  20	  1933,	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  his	  goal	  of	  becoming	  the	  Führer’s	  
philosophical-­‐consul.	  To	  this	  end,	  he	  sent	  a	  public	  telegram	  to	  Hitler,	  and	  
October	  1,	  he	  was	  appointed	  Führer	  of	  Freiburg,	  placing	  special	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  fact	  that	  his	  goal	  was	  to	  reconcile	  the	  education	  of	  the	  sciences	  with	  the	  
aspirations	  of	  the	  National	  Socialist	  State.	  Further,	  on	  September	  4	  1933,	  in	  
Miller	  6	  
the	  view	  of	  Sheehan	  (1988,	  p.	  39)	  emphasizes	  that	  Heidegger	  was	  offered	  to	  
take	  the	  chair	  of	  philosophy	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Munich,	  to	  which	  he	  replied	  
that	  he	  must	  put	  his	  own	  aims	  to	  the	  side	  and	  do	  the	  work	  that	  Hitler	  needed	  
him	  to	  do.	  On	  November	  3	  1933,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  39)	  put	  into	  
effect	  a	  Nazi	  law	  at	  Freiburg	  that	  stripped	  financial	  aid	  from	  all	  non-­‐Aryan	  
students,	  yet	  awarded	  aid	  to	  those	  who	  belonged	  to	  military	  groups	  such	  as	  
the	  S.S.	  or	  S.A.	  A	  month	  later,	  a	  group	  of	  German	  academics	  received	  a	  letter	  
from	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  39)	  seeking	  monetary	  support	  for	  a	  book	  
that	  would	  contain	  professors’	  pro-­‐Hitler	  speeches	  that	  would	  dispersed	  to	  
the	  world’s	  intellectuals,	  affirming	  that	  the	  signature	  page	  would	  be	  devoid	  of	  
non-­‐Aryans.	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  39)	  also	  gave	  advice	  to	  the	  minister	  
of	  education	  in	  Baden,	  asserting	  that	  he	  should	  choose	  a	  job	  candidate	  for	  
professorship	  based	  on	  the	  criteria	  of	  who	  can	  carry	  out	  the	  education	  agenda	  
for	  the	  National	  Socialist	  Party.	  	  
	   Heidegger’s	  support	  for	  the	  Nazi	  party	  was	  not	  merely	  evident	  in	  his	  
professional	  choices	  during	  his	  rectorship,	  he	  also	  had	  a	  tendency	  of	  
denouncing	  colleagues	  in	  secrecy	  if	  he	  deemed	  them	  unfit	  for	  the	  agenda	  for	  
the	  National	  Socialist	  Party.	  For	  example,	  a	  chemistry	  professor	  at	  Freiburg	  
since	  1926	  (and	  later	  was	  awarded	  the	  Nobel	  prize	  in	  1953)	  named	  Hermann	  
Staudinger	  became	  a	  victim	  of	  Heidegger’s	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  40):	  Heidegger	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tipped	  off	  to	  the	  local	  minister	  of	  education	  that	  Staudinger	  had	  been	  a	  pacifist	  
during	  the	  first	  World	  War,	  after	  the	  Gestapo	  confirmed	  this,	  Heidegger	  called	  
on	  the	  ministry	  to	  terminate	  Staudinger’s	  employment	  without	  pension.	  
Fearing	  a	  foreign	  policy	  issue	  (Staudinger	  was	  an	  internationally	  reputable	  
chemist),	  Heidegger	  later	  advised	  issuing	  a	  less	  harsh	  punishment,	  but	  the	  
ministry	  tormented	  the	  chemist	  by	  forcing	  him	  to	  submit	  a	  letter	  of	  
resignation,	  tearing	  it	  up	  six	  months	  later	  and	  rehiring	  him	  to	  his	  former	  
position.	  A	  more	  disturbing	  example	  was	  that	  of	  Dr.	  Eduard	  Baumgarten:	  in	  
the	  1920s,	  Baumgarten	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  40)	  lectured	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Wisconsin,	  but	  decided	  to	  return	  home	  to	  Germany	  for	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
research	  with	  Heidegger.	  After	  becoming	  close	  enough	  friends	  that	  Heidegger	  
and	  his	  wife	  were	  named	  godparents	  of	  Baumgarten’s	  children,	  the	  two	  had	  a	  
falling	  out	  over	  Baumgarten’s	  inquiry	  into	  American	  pragmatism.	  After	  
Baumgarten	  left	  Freiburg	  to	  teach	  American	  philosophy	  and	  culture	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Göttingen,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  40)	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  
Göttingen’s	  head	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  Nazi	  professors,	  Dr.	  Vogel,	  that	  
condemned	  Baumgarten	  for	  not	  being	  a	  National	  Socialist,	  for	  being	  in	  the	  
Heidelberg	  circle	  of	  liberal-­‐democratic	  intellectuals,	  and	  for	  working	  with	  “the	  
Jew	  Fränkel”	  (Eduard	  Fränkel,	  professor	  of	  classics	  at	  Freiburg,	  who	  was	  fired	  
from	  Göttingen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Nazi	  racial	  laws).	  Believing	  Heidegger’s	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(Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  40)	  letter	  to	  be	  too	  filled	  with	  hatred,	  Dr.	  Vogel	  would	  not	  
use	  the	  accusations	  to	  fire	  Baumgarten,	  so	  he	  filed	  it	  away.	  Fourteen	  months	  
later,	  Dr.	  Vogel’s	  replacement	  found	  the	  letter,	  sent	  it	  to	  the	  minister	  of	  
education	  in	  Berlin,	  who	  subsequently	  suspended	  Baumgarten	  from	  lecturing	  
and	  recommended	  that	  he	  leave	  the	  country.	  Luckily	  for	  Baumgarten,	  a	  
secretary	  made	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  letter,	  and	  Baumgarten	  was	  able	  to	  keep	  his	  job	  
after	  an	  appeal.	  	  
	  
Post-­‐Rectorship	  
Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  38)	  would	  have	  you	  believe	  that	  after	  his	  
rectorship	  ended,	  so	  did	  his	  allegiance	  to	  the	  Nazi	  party,	  however,	  it	  is	  now	  
well	  documented	  that	  his	  allegiance	  went	  well	  beyond	  1934.	  Of	  course,	  one	  
has	  to	  consider	  the	  case	  of	  Max	  Müller,	  one	  of	  Germany’s	  most	  renowned	  
Catholic	  intellectuals	  post-­‐World	  War	  I.	  An	  anti-­‐Nazi,	  Müller	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  
p.	  40)	  was	  in	  Heidegger’s	  circle	  of	  gifted	  students	  and	  held	  a	  position	  as	  
student	  leader,	  but	  when	  Heidegger	  joined	  the	  NDSAP	  in	  May	  of	  1933,	  Müller	  
restrained	  from	  attending	  his	  lectures.	  Heidegger	  fired	  Müller	  from	  his	  
student	  leadership	  position	  seven	  months	  later,	  deeming	  Müller’s	  politics	  
unsuitable,	  however,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  end.	  In	  1938,	  Müller	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  
41)	  applied	  for	  a	  teaching	  position	  at	  Freiburg	  University,	  but	  saw	  his	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opportunity	  blocked	  by	  Heidegger:	  when	  prompted	  by	  the	  university	  
administration,	  Heidegger	  told	  them	  that	  Müller	  was	  a	  great	  scholar,	  but	  his	  
disposition	  towards	  the	  regime	  was	  unfavorable.	  Müller	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  
41)	  met	  with	  Heidegger,	  pleading	  him	  to	  strike	  his	  comments	  regarding	  
Müller’s	  politics	  from	  the	  letter;	  Heidegger	  denied,	  and	  Müller	  was	  denied	  a	  
position	  “for	  reasons	  of	  world-­‐view	  and	  politics.”	  	  
	   If	  some	  damning	  evidence	  of	  Heidegger’s	  compromise	  exists,	  it’s	  that	  
with	  relation	  to	  his	  attitude	  regarding	  the	  Holocaust.	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  
1988,	  pp.	  41-­‐2)	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  Holocaust-­‐denier,	  but	  he	  was	  remarkably	  
silent	  on	  the	  issue,	  and	  even	  plead	  ignorance,	  though	  now	  there	  is	  
documentation	  to	  prove	  that	  he	  was	  fully	  aware	  of	  what	  was	  happening.	  
Living	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Baden,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  pp.	  41-­‐2)	  had	  to	  have	  
people	  disappearing:	  the	  Jewish	  population	  of	  Baden	  in	  1933	  was	  20,600,	  in	  
1940	  it	  was	  down	  to	  6,400,	  then	  nearly	  all	  of	  those	  that	  remained	  were	  sent	  to	  
France,	  then	  to	  a	  death	  camp	  close	  to	  Lublin	  called	  Izbica,	  leaving	  only	  820	  
Jews	  in	  Baden	  throughout	  the	  1940s.	  Giving	  Heidegger	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  
doubt	  (perhaps	  he	  thought	  they	  were	  being	  moved	  around,	  not	  exterminated,	  
after	  all,	  he	  has	  no	  published	  work	  that	  mentions	  the	  Holocaust),	  one	  delve	  a	  
little	  further,	  perhaps	  into	  his	  lectures,	  to	  get	  a	  better	  understanding.	  From	  a	  
lecture	  concerning	  technology	  on	  01	  December	  1949,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  
Miller	  10	  
1988,	  p.	  41-­‐42)	  advanced:	  
Agriculture	  is	  now	  a	  motorized	  food-­‐industry—in	  essence,	  the	  
same	  as	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  corpses	  in	  gas	  chambers	  and	  
extermination	  camps,	  the	  same	  as	  the	  blockading	  and	  starving	  of	  
nations,	  the	  same	  as	  the	  manufacture	  of	  hydrogen	  bombs.	  
Then,	  in	  another	  lecture	  on	  the	  exact	  same	  day,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  
42)	  articulated:	  
Hundreds	  of	  thousands	  die	  en	  masse.	  Do	  they	  die?	  They	  succumb.	  
They	  are	  done	  in.	  Do	  they	  die?	  They	  become	  mere	  quanta,	  items	  in	  
an	  inventory	  in	  the	  business	  of	  manufacturing	  corpses.	  Do	  they	  
die?	  They	  are	  liquidated	  inconspicuously	  in	  extermination	  camps.	  
And	  even	  apart	  from	  that,	  right	  now	  millions	  of	  impoverished	  
people	  are	  perishing	  from	  hunger	  in	  China.	  But	  to	  die	  is	  to	  endure	  
death	  in	  its	  essence.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  die	  means	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  this	  
endurance.	  We	  are	  capable	  of	  this	  only	  if	  the	  essence	  of	  death	  
makes	  our	  own	  essence	  possible	  
	  
In	  1948	  and	  in	  a	  letter,	  Herbert	  Marcuse,	  a	  former	  student	  of	  
Heidegger’s,	  questioned:	  Why	  had	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  42)	  never	  
spoken	  up	  out	  about	  the	  number	  of	  Jews	  killed?	  	  Heidegger	  replied	  by	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stressing	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Republic	  had	  killed	  off	  many	  of	  their	  own	  people,	  and	  
that	  Marcuse,	  in	  his	  letter,	  should	  have	  replaced	  the	  word	  “Jews”	  with	  “East	  
Germans”;	  Heidegger	  also	  stated	  that	  such	  Nazi	  atrocities	  were	  hidden	  from	  
German	  people,	  but	  were	  widely	  available	  to	  the	  world’s	  public.	  
	   Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  43)	  would	  have	  had	  you	  believe	  that	  his	  
resignation	  from	  the	  rectorate	  at	  Freiburg	  was	  a	  result	  of	  protest,	  but	  further	  
evidence	  shows	  that	  Heidegger	  simply	  made	  too	  many	  academic	  enemies,	  
partly	  because	  of	  his	  effort	  in	  putting	  deans	  in	  positions	  they	  did	  not	  want,	  nor	  
did	  the	  departments	  want	  them,	  simply	  to	  stand	  the	  university	  system	  on	  its	  
head;	  but	  in	  April	  of	  1934,	  the	  ministry	  of	  education	  fully	  anticipated	  
Heidegger’s	  continuance	  in	  his	  position	  as	  Führer-­‐rector.	  Another	  damning	  
piece	  of	  evidence	  against	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  42)	  is	  the	  
documentation	  that	  confirms	  he	  misrepresented	  at	  least	  one	  of	  his	  lectures	  in	  
the	  published	  edition:	  Heidegger	  presented	  a	  lecture	  in	  1935	  called	  
Einführung	  in	  die	  Metaphysik	  that	  was	  later	  published	  in	  1953.	  According	  to	  
the	  published	  version,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  42)	  implies	  that	  he	  is	  
against	  some	  kind	  of	  “bad	  Nazism”	  (the	  NSDAP)	  and	  is	  trying	  to	  
philosophically	  defend	  a	  kind	  of	  “good	  Nazism”.	  	  On	  two	  separate	  occasions,	  
Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  42),	  contended	  that	  no	  change	  to	  the	  lectures	  
had	  been	  made	  pre-­‐publication,	  however,	  Professor	  Harmut	  Buchner	  helped	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Heidegger	  review	  the	  gallery	  proofs,	  and	  Buchner	  holds	  that	  he	  saw	  the	  
original	  wording,	  a	  wording	  that	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  two	  separate	  National	  
Socialist	  movements,	  and	  made	  the	  recommendation	  for	  Heidegger	  to	  correct	  
them	  for	  fear	  of	  misunderstanding.	  Heidegger	  refused	  to	  alter	  the	  text	  on	  
grounds	  that	  it	  would	  be	  “a	  falsification	  of	  history”,	  however,	  Heidegger	  later	  
altered	  them	  anyway.	  Until	  he	  died,	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan,	  1988,	  p.	  42)	  
maintained	  that	  he	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  text;	  if	  you	  travel	  to	  Marbach,	  Germany	  




This	  inquiry	  has	  sought	  to	  establish	  that	  Martin	  Heidegger	  registers	  as	  a	  
compromised	  man	  in	  his	  ethics	  and	  philosophy.	  First,	  considering	  Heidegger’s	  
roots	  through	  an	  Aristotelian	  and	  Pre-­‐Socratic	  lens,	  this	  inquiry	  introduced	  
Heidegger’s	  philosophical	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Nazi	  Party.	  Then,	  by	  
deciphering	  his	  rectorial	  address	  in	  1933	  and	  subsequent	  actions	  during	  his	  
rectorship	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Freiburg,	  this	  inquiry	  has	  contemplated	  the	  
level	  of	  Nazi	  indoctrination	  in	  Heidegger’s	  work.	  Finally,	  this	  inquiry	  has	  taken	  
careful	  investigation	  into	  Heidegger’s	  compromised	  character	  through	  his	  
actions	  in	  the	  post-­‐rectorate	  phase.	  Heidegger’s	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Nazi	  Party	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is	  one	  that	  has	  been	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  for	  decades;	  accusations	  against	  
arguably	  the	  most	  important	  philosopher	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  of	  
accepting	  genocide	  has	  only	  become	  more	  prevalent	  with	  the	  more	  evidence	  
collected.	  Heidegger	  himself	  requested	  that	  a	  controversial	  interview	  with	  Der	  
Spiegel	  regarding	  his	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Nazi	  Party	  be	  published	  only	  
posthumously.	  Heidegger	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  Nietzsche;	  the	  irony	  that	  
Nietzsche	  was	  misrepresented	  by	  the	  Nazi	  Party,	  yet	  Heidegger	  was	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